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Key Points
 The growing industrial and research interest in protecting privacy and fighting cyberattacks for smart homes
has sparked various innovations in security- and privacy-enhancing technologies (S/PETs) powered by edge
computing. The complex technical set-up has however raised a whole series of legal issues surrounding the
regulation of smart home with data protection law.
 To determine how responsibility and accountability should be fairly assumed by stakeholders, there is a press-
ing need to first clarify the roles of these parties within the existing data protection legal framework. This arti-
cle focuses on two legal concepts under the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) as the mechanisms
to (dis)assign responsibilities to various categories of entities in a domestic Internet of Things (IoT) context:
joint controllership and the household exemption.
 A close examination of the relevant provisions and case-law shows a widening notion of joint controllership
and a narrowing scope for the household exemption. While this interpretative approach may prevent evasion
of accountability in specific cases, it may lead to the unintended consequence of imposing disproportionate
compliance burdens on developers, contributors, and users of smart home safety technologies. By discourag-
ing users to adopt S/PETs, data protection law may likely lead to a lower level of privacy and security
protection.
 The differential responsibilities among joint controllers as envisaged in case-law may reconcile the tensions to
some degree, but certain limitations remain. The regulatory dilemma in this regard highlights some underly-
ing assumptions of data protection law that are no longer valid with regard to a smart home, and thus calls
for further conceptual and empirical studies on fair reassignment of responsibility and accountability in a do-
mestic IoT setting.
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Introduction: towards a safer home
built by many
Smart home Internet of Things (IoT) devices are notori-
ously badly secured. Commercial practices geared to-
wards usability see devices shipped with default
passwords, but users rarely change these. This has led to
cases of IP connected cameras being remotely accessible
via search engine Shodan, enabling babies to be moni-
tored sleeping.1 Similarly, poorly secured devices can be
more vulnerable to remote access attacks, implicating
them in botnets. We have seen this in the case of the
Mirai,2 Persirai3 and Reaper4 botnets.5 Concurrently,
there are growing concerns about the personal data-
driven economy resulting from new compliance
requirements and high fines under the General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR).6 A key issue is the
dominant cloud-based big data analytics infrastructure
dominating IoT product and service design. It enables
creation of cheaper devices with data collected locally,
analysed remotely, and the service provided locally
again.7
These IoT privacy and security concerns have
sparked a growing research agenda in creating local data
storage and analysis infrastructures, where data analytics
is brought to the data, as opposed to centralizing the
data. This provides users more control over who
accesses their data, why, for how long, and so forth.
From a regulatory perspective, the European Data
Protection Supervisor (EDPS) has extolled the virtues of
such personal information management systems
(PIMS) sitting at the edge of the network,8 as has a re-
cent Royal Society report.9
Development and adoption of security- and
privacy-enhancing technologies (S/PETs) are not just
priorities on the EU’s Digital Single Market
Strategy,10 but indeed encouraged or even required
by the GDPR.11 Yet, the uptake of these technologies
will depend on a suitable legal environment with ap-
propriate regulatory incentives provided for develop-
ers and users of such technologies and without
imposing excessive compliance burdens on them. We
however have concerns over the potential impact of
data protection law on S/PETs in a domestic IoT
context, especially considering how responsibility and
accountability are assigned to various groups of
actors under the current legal framework. The notion
of joint controllers and the household exemption are
therefore of significant relevance as they serve as the
GDPR’s primary mechanisms to identify the parties
responsible to ensure data protection requirements
are met.
To illustrate the implications of joint controllership
and the household exemption for domestic IoT S/PETs
with edge computing solutions, this article will look at
two ongoing research initiatives. The Databox project
(funded by the UK’s Engineering and Physical Sciences
Research Council, EPSRC) demonstrates how data pro-
tection principles can be built into data processing
architectures by design.12 With personal data stored and
analysed on a local PIMS, Databox aims to enable users
to benefit from the use of their data without
compromising their data privacy. Work by Urquhart
et al. considers how it enables accountability, as re-
quired in Article 5(2) of the GDPR, by providing mech-
anisms both for substantive compliance, but also
1 Leo Kelion, ‘Trendnet Security cam Flaw exposes Video Feeds on Net’
(BBC, 8 March 2012) <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-
16919664> accessed 9 December 2019.
2 Monty Munford, ‘Could your “smart” Home be a Weapon of Web
Destruction?’ (BBC, 28 October 2016) <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/
business-37776964> accessed 9 December 2019.
3 Danny Palmer, ‘120,000 IoT Cameras Vulnerable to New Persirai Botnet
Say Researchers’ (ZDNet, 10 May 2017) <https://www.zdnet.com/article/
120000-iot-cameras-vulnerable-to-new-persirai-botnet-say-researchers/>
accessed 9 December 2019.
4 John Leyden, ‘Do Fear the Reaper: Huge Army of Webcams, Routers
Raised from ‘one million’ Hacked Orgs’ The Register (20 October 2017)
<https://www.theregister.co.uk/2017/10/20/iot_reaper_botnet_growing_
fast/> accessed 9 December 2019.
5 See also European Union Agency for Cybersecurity, ENISA Threat
Landscape Report 2018 (2019) <https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publica
tions/enisa-threat-landscape-report-2018> accessed 9 December 2019.
6 Mark Sweney, ‘Marriott to be Fined Nearly £100m over GDPR Breach’
The Guardian (9 July 2019) <https://www.theguardian.com/business/
2019/jul/09/marriott-fined-over-gdpr-breach-ico> accessed 9 December
2019.
7 Lachlan Urquhart, Tom Lodge and Andy Crabtree, ‘Demonstrably Doing
Accountability in the Internet of Things’ (2019) 27(1) International
Journal of Law and Information Technology 1.
8 European Data Protection Supervisor, EDPS Opinion on Personal
Information Management Systems (2016).
9 The Royal Society, Protecting privacy in practice: The current use, develop-
ment and limits of Privacy Enhancing Technologies in data analysis (2019)
<https://royalsociety.org/-/media/policy/projects/privacy-enhancing-tech
nologies/privacy-enhancing-technologies-report.pdf> accessed 9
December 2019.
10 Commission, ‘A Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe’ (2015)
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the
Committee of the Regions COM(2015) 192 final; Commission, ‘Mid-
Term Review on the implementation of the Digital Single Market
Strategy: A Connected Digital Single Market for All’ (2017)
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the
Committee of the Regions COM(2017) 228 final.
11 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard
to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such
data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection
Regulation) [2016] OJ L119/1 (‘GDPR’), arts 5(1)(a), (c), (e), (f), 24, 25,
Recital 78.
12 Richard Mortier and others, ‘Personal Data Management with the
Databox: What’s Inside the Box?’ (2016 ACM Workshop on Cloud-
Assisted Networking, Irvine, California, 12 December 2016).
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demonstrating compliance.13 Another EPSRC-funded
project, Defence Against Dark Artefacts (DADA),14
addresses smart home cybersecurity risks by identifying
strategies for providing security threat management at
the edge of the network. This is achieved by screening
the behaviour of devices on the network, and detecting
when activity is abnormal. If data flows are going to un-
expected destinations or exhibiting abnormal patterns,
this may indicate threat actors with remote access or
stealing information.15
The development and operation of both Databox
and DADA, however, relies heavily on the collection
and analysis of device data (which may turn out to be
personal or even sensitive data) and involve a wide
range of actors who may or may not be categorized as
data controllers or data subjects.16 The complexity of le-
gal relationships in IoT has been highlighted in the liter-
ature,17 and S/PETs will only further increase such
complexity. Stakeholders surrounding such systems in-
clude architectural developers (eg Databox and DADA
developers), third-party component builders (service/
app/driver providers), device manufacturers and users,
while homeowners, family members, neighbours and visi-
tors may be affected. All these complexities pose press-
ing questions in both theoretical and practical terms
about how responsibilities are managed, and who the
different stakeholders are.
In a scenario where, for example, a homeowner has
set up the smart home with such an S/PET solution,
should they be treated as a (joint) data controller? If so,
can they reasonably claim they are exempted from the
controller obligations on the basis of a purely household
activity? What about the other involved parties, such as
developers of the S/PET system? Fundamentally, and as
will be shown below, these questions may eventually
come down to the fair allocation of data protection re-
sponsibility and accountability among a range of stake-
holders. Edge computing for smart homes holds great
promise with its architecture designed to keep the use of
personal data inside the home, but it remains unclear
whether using such technologies would turn
homeowners into liable joint controllers. As the rest of
this article will show, the way joint controllers and the
household exemption have been construed in case-
law—with the intention to provide seamless protection
to data subjects—may end up running counter to this
objective by creating deterrence against the uptake of S/
PETs such as Databox and DADA.
Joint controllership: everyone is a data
controller?
In ascertaining who is responsible for what sorts of data
protection obligations, the first step is always to identify
the data controller, or controllers. Under the account-
ability principle of the GDPR, data controller is the one
ultimately responsible for compliance of data protection
law.18 While other categories of actors, such as data pro-
cessors or —as will be explained below—developers of
data processing systems, also play a role in ensuring all
data protection principles are observed, the major bur-
dens fall on data controllers.
The GDPR has maintained the same definition of
data controller as under the Data Protection
Directive (DPD), which is ‘the natural or legal per-
son, public authority, agency or other body which,
alone or jointly with others, determines the purposes
and means of the processing of personal data’.19 It
follows that, although the GDPR has introduced a
number of new provisions on (joint) controllership,
there is no reason to assume that the case-law
handed down by the Court of Justice of the EU
(CJEU) or the opinions issued by the Article 29
Working Party (A29 WP, now the European Data
Protection Board, EDPB) at the time of the DPD are
no longer relevant, except where they are clearly con-
trary to the new rules. In fact, it would be helpful to
review how the scope of data controller and the no-
tion of joint controllership have been interpreted by
the Court and the WP, which would shed further
light on how the GDPR is likely to apply to future
cases involving a spectrum of stakeholders around
13 Urquhart, Lodge and Crabtree (n 7).
14 Horizon Digital Economy Research, ‘Defence Against Dark Artefacts’
<https://www.horizon.ac.uk/project/defence-against-dark-artefacts/>
accessed 9 December 2019.
15 Sandra Siby, Rajib Ranjan Maiti and Nils Ole Tippenhauer, ‘IoTScanner:
Detecting Privacy Threats in IoT Neighborhoods’ (3rd ACM
International Workshop on IoT Privacy, Trust, and Security, Abu Dhabi,
2 April 2017); Ayyoob Hamza and others, ‘Clear as MUD: Generating,
Validating and Applying IoT Behavioral Profiles’ (2018 Workshop on
IoT Security and Privacy, Budapest, 20 August 2018).
16 Jenna Ma¨kinen, ‘Data Quality, Sensitive Data and Joint Controllership as
Examples of Grey Areas in the Existing Data Protection Framework for
the Internet of Things’ (2015) 24(3) Information & Communications
Technology Law 262.
17 Rolf H Weber and Romana Weber, Internet of Things: Legal Perspectives
(Springer, Berlin 2010); Guido Noto La Diega and Ian Walden,
‘Contracting for the “Internet of Things”: Looking into the Nest’ (2016)
7(2) European Journal of Law and Technology; Luca Bolognini and
Paolo Balboni, ‘IoT and Cloud Computing: Specific Security and Data
Protection Issues’ in Se´bastien Ziegle (ed), Internet of Things Security and
Data Protection (Springer, Cham 2019).
18 GDPR, art 5(2).
19 Ibid art 4(7). See also Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals
with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement
of such data [1995] OJ L281/31 (‘DPD’), art 2(d).
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smart home technical solutions like Databox and
DADA. As will be shown in the rest of this section,
while various guidance documents issued by EU reg-
ulators exhibit a stronger focus on scenarios where
joint controllership arises from legal arrangement be-
tween controllers, CJEU case-law has broadened the
possibility by considering situations where controllers
are aligned merely by technical or organizational
configurations.
Guidance by European regulators: joint
controllership by legal arrangement
When assessing the nature of controllership with regard
to a particular entity, one would need to address two
key issues: (i) What makes an entity a data controller in-
stead of a mere data processor or even just a ‘facilitator’;
(ii) What makes two or more entities joint controllers
rather than independent, sole controllers for different
processing operations. Indeed, these are among the ma-
jor topics covered by the A29 WP’s 2010 Opinion on
the concepts of controller and processor.20 Such distinc-
tions are of important legal significance in that, on the
one hand, data controllership means the assumption of
the primary responsibilities for compliance with data
protection law,21 and on the other, joint controllership
means they are under the obligation to make arrange-
ments for shared responsibilities and might be held
jointly liable for the entirety of data processing.22
The first question regarding the distinction between
data controller and data processor is certainly of theo-
retical and practical significance to protecting personal
data in a domestic IoT context, not least because of the
cloud-based approach prevalent in the design of many
IoT devices, which leads to the ongoing debate about
the role of cloud providers as data processors.23
Importance as this issue is, it falls outside of the main
focus of this article and should be a subject matter for
future research.
The second question, which is more relevant to the
inquiry of this article, concerns the conditions for a
group of entities to become joint controllers. The WP
points out from the outset of the Opinion that
‘pluralistic control’ is possible and may take a wide vari-
ety of forms.24 The interactions between joint control-
lers may reflect ‘a very close relationship (sharing, for
example, all purposes and means of a processing) or a
more loose relationship (for example, sharing only pur-
poses or means, or a part thereof)’.25 However, the
mere existence of cooperation between different entities
do not necessarily render them joint controllers.26
Rather, they can be independent (sole) controllers re-
sponsible only for their part of the data processing
chain.27 That said, it is also stressed that the assessment
must also take into consideration whether ‘at macro-
level’ the processing operations form a ‘set of opera-
tions’ with joint purposes and means.28 This is particu-
larly likely to be the case when the involved parties have
set up shared infrastructures to process personal data.29
The examples and discussions throughout the
Opinion show that what the WP envisages as joint con-
trollership relies on a legal arrangement whereby ‘clear
and equally effective allocation of obligations and re-
sponsibilities’ can be established between controllers.
Even when the formal agreement between controllers
do not reflect the actual legal relationship (eg designat-
ing one party as a data processor while it actually exer-
cises control under the agreement), the substance of
such an agreement, accordingly to the Opinion, never-
theless serves as an important indication of the ‘contrac-
tual arrangements’ or ‘factual circumstance’ against
which the validity of appointment of (joint) controllers,
as well as their respective responsibilities, is assessed.30
Such a ‘joint controllership by legal arrangement’ ap-
proach is also mirrored in a latest EDPB guidance, re-
quiring that ‘[w]henever joint controllership is
envisaged, the parties must apportion in a clear and
transparent way their respective responsibilities vis-a`-vis
the data subject’.31 Likewise, the discussion in the recent
EDPS guidelines on the concepts of controller, proces-
sor and joint controllership focuses heavily on scenarios
where ‘by entering into [an] agreement, the parties
commonly determine (or converge on) the purpose and
essential elements of the means’.32 It should be noted
that the EDPS’s analysis is conducted under Regulation
20 Art 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 1/2010 on the concepts
of “controller” and “processor”’ (2010) 00264/10/EN WP 169.
21 DPD, art 6(2); GDPR, art 5(2).
22 GDPR, arts 26(3), 82(4). See also art 29 Data Protection Working Party
(n 20) 22.
23 Art 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 05/2012 on Cloud
Computing’ (2012) 01037/12/EN WP 196; W. Kuan Hon, Christopher
Millard and Ian Walden, ‘Who is Responsible for “Personal Data” in
Cloud Computing?—The Cloud of Unknowing, Part 2’ (2012) 2(1)
International Data Privacy Law 3; Bolognini and Balboni (n 17).
24 Art 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 1/2010 on the concepts
of “controller” and “processor”’ (n 20) 18.
25 Ibid 19.
26 Ibid 20.
27 Ibid 19.
28 Ibid 20.
29 Ibid 20–21.
30 Ibid 11–12, 17–24.
31 European Data Protection Board, ‘Guidelines 4/2019 on Article 25 Data
Protection by Design and by Default’ (2019) 15.
32 European Data Protection Supervisor, ‘EDPS Guidelines on the concepts
of controller, processor and joint controllership under Regulation (EU)
2018/1725’ (2019) 22–26.
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2018/1725, which governs processing of personal data
by EU institutions,33 rather than the GDPR. However,
given the similarity in substance and terminology be-
tween the two Regulations,34 it remains helpful in re-
vealing the perceptions of EU data protection regulators
towards the notion of joint controllership under the
GDPR.
To sum up, the interpretative approach taken by
European regulators has placed significant emphasis on
the co-decision made between actors involved in the
data processing in question when ascertaining their legal
status. It is even suggested that data controllers can be
‘appointed’ by means of legal arrangements, although
such an appointment, without prejudice to the data
subject’s rights against each of them,35 should be ‘null
and void’ if the designated party does not actually exer-
cise effective control over the processing.36 Moreover,
the joint responsibilities are considered a matter that
should ‘be determined in principle by controllers’ as
long as the rights of data subjects remain fully
respected.37
From Google Spain to Fashion ID: joint
controllership by technical and organizational
configurations
Four years after the WP’s Opnion, the CJEU had the op-
portunity to examine the concept of data controller in
the high-profile Google Spain case.38 In answering the
question referred by the national court as to whether
Google constitutes a data controller by operating a
search engine that indexes and presents as results the
webpages that contain personal data, the Court exam-
ines the role of Google in the spreading of information
on the Internet. It has come to the conclusion that
Google ‘plays a decisive role in the overall dissemination
of those data in that it renders the latter accessible to
any internet user making a search on the basis of the
data subject’s name, including to internet users who
otherwise would not have found the web page on which
those data are published’.39 Also, for the first time, the
Court has declared that both the letter and the spirit of
data protection law necessitates a broad definition of
data controller to ensure ‘effective and complete protec-
tion of data subjects’,40 which, as will be shown below,
has been consistently reiterated by the Court in later
decisions.
While the Court has not directly dealt with the issue
of joint controllers in this case, an interesting remark
was made about how joint controllership may possibly
stem from technical configurations. To explain why a
website’s ability to opt out from Google’s indexing
(with the ‘robots.txt’ protocol or the ‘noindex’ code)
does not mean Google does not exercise control over
the processing of data, the Court notes that ‘even if that
option for publishers of websites were to mean that they
determine the means of that processing jointly with
[Google], this finding would not remove any of the lat-
ter’s responsibility’.41 While stated in a purely hypothet-
ical manner, this observation seems to suggest that it is
possible for a website to become a joint controller with
Google simply by using (or not using) certain technical
settings.
The possibly loose relationships between joint con-
trollers are also recognized in Wirtschaftsakademie,
where the Court rules that the administrator of a
Facebook fan page is a joint controller with Facebook.42
It is reasoned that ‘the administrator of a fan page
hosted on Facebook, by creating such a page, gives
Facebook the opportunity to place cookies on the com-
puter or other device of a person visiting its fan page’.43
It is also pointed out that the administrator ‘has an in-
fluence on the processing of personal data’ by ‘defin[-
ing] the criteria in accordance with which the statistics
are to be drawn up and even designat[ing] the catego-
ries of persons whose personal data is to be made use of
by Facebook’, which ‘contributes to the processing of
the personal data of visitors to its page’.44
While the Court took note of the potential contrac-
tual relationship between a fan page administrator and
Facebook, this did not play a substantial role in the
Court’s analysis.45 Rather, the focus was entirely on how
the setting up of fan page would technically facilitate
Facebook to collect personal data from its users. Hence,
it becomes clear that, through Google Spain and
Wirtschaftsakademie, the Court has established what we
33 Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 23 October 2018 on the protection of natural persons with re-
gard to the processing of personal data by the Union institutions, bodies,
offices and agencies and on the free movement of such data, and repeal-
ing Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 and Decision No 1247/2002/EC [2018]
OJ L295/39.
34 See, in particular, ibid arts 3(8), 28; GDPR, arts 4(7), 26.
35 GDPR, arts 26(3), 82(2).
36 Art 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 1/2010 on the concepts
of “controller” and “processor”’ (n 20) 11–12.
37 Ibid 24.
38 Case C-131/12 Google Spain and Google [2014] OJ C 212/4.
39 Ibid para 36.
40 Ibid para 34.
41 Ibid para 40.
42 Case C-210/16 Wirtschaftsakademie Schleswig-Holstein [2018] OJ C 268/
3.
43 Ibid para 35.
44 Ibid para 36.
45 Ibid para 32.
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refer to as ‘joint controllership by technical
configurations’.
In a later case Jehovan todistajat,46 the Court further
expanded the scope to also cover ‘joint controllership
by organisational configurations’. The Court was asked
to clarify, inter alia, whether the Jehovah’s Witnesses
Community should be regarded as a joint controller
with its members who collect personal data through
door-to-door preaching. An answer was given in the af-
firmative, on the ground that the ‘preaching activity is
. . . organised, coordinated and encouraged by that com-
munity’.47 In other words, the mere exertion of organi-
zational influence on how data are processed and for
what purposes will suffice to turn an entity into a joint
controller.
It is also noteworthy that the Court made it clear that
determining the purposes and means of data processing
does not necessarily involve ‘the use of written guide-
lines or instructions from the controller’.48 Nor is it rel-
evant whether the involved party has actual access to
the personal data in question.49 This clearly sets out a
broad scope of joint controllers who do not always have
to jointly make decisions on the most important aspects
of data processing.
In the latest decision, Fashion ID,50 the Court further
confirmed how joint controllership may arise regardless
of the lack of a legal relationship between the parties
concerned, or the absence of access to the personal data
by one of them. Like Wirtschaftsakademie, the Court
was asked to give clarifications on joint controllership
with Facebook, but in a different setting: Placing a ‘Like’
button on one’s website that would trigger the user’s
browser to communicate with Facebook’s server and
thus make certain information accessible by the latter.
The judgment has explained in detail how both the pur-
poses and means are jointly determined by Facebook
and the website.
On the one hand, as the Court explains, ‘Fashion ID
appears to have embedded on its website the Facebook
“Like” button made available to website operators by
Facebook Ireland while fully aware of the fact that it
serves as a tool for the collection and disclosure by
transmission of the personal data of visitors to that web-
site’.51 By including such codes that direct the user’s
browser to communicate with Facebook, reasons the
Court, the website has exercised ‘a decisive influence’
on the means by which the personal data is processed.52
On the other hand, Facebook and Fashion ID are held
to have jointly determined the purposes of the process-
ing, which is promoting the latter’s products ‘in the eco-
nomic interests of both Fashion ID and Facebook
Ireland, for whom the fact that it can use those data for
its own commercial purposes is the consideration for
the benefit to Fashion ID’.53
Such joint determination, unlike in
Wirtschaftsakademie, does not require the operator of
the website to sign up for Facebook’s service, and thus
does not necessarily involve a prior contractual relation-
ship between the parties. Again, all it takes is the techni-
cal configurations respectively arranged on both sides
following a technical protocol that would altogether en-
able Facebook to gain access to the personal data in
question.
Implications for the smart home ecosystem
From Google Spain to Fashion ID, there has been an evi-
dent and consistent confirmation of the broad scope—if
not an expansion of the scope—of joint controllers.54
Also unmistakably and unmissably clear is the strong
message from the case-law that this approach is neces-
sary to ensure a high level of data protection afforded to
data subjects.55 Of course, a widely inclusive notion of
joint controllership may arguably hold responsible enti-
ties accountable more tightly, and may prevent them
from escaping from their data protection duties.
However, this may also mean unnecessary or even un-
fair compliance burden on certain actors involved in,
for example, the development and adoption of edge
computing technologies, such as Databox and DADA.
Such an impact, as will be discussed below, might run
counter to certain policy objectives of data protection
law, in particular when the responsibilities among stake-
holders are not clearly demarcated.
For developers of smart home S/PETs—either the ar-
chitectural designer of the system or the collaborating
or independent developers of certain components—the
widening scope of joint controllership means that they
may well fall within the definition of a joint controller,
46 Case C-25/17 Jehovan todistajat [2018] OJ C 319/7.
47 Ibid para 70.
48 Ibid para 67.
49 Ibid para 69; Wirtschaftsakademie (n 42) para 38; Case C-40/17 Fashion
ID [2019] para 82.
50 Fashion ID, ibid. For a detailed analysis of the judgment, see Louisa
Specht-Riemenschneider and Ruben Schneider, ‘Stuck Half Way: The
Limitation of Joint Control after Fashion ID (C-40/17)’ (2020) 69(2)
GRUR International 159.
51 Fashion ID (n 49) para 77.
52 Ibid para 78.
53 Ibid para 80.
54 Lilian Edwards and others, ‘Data Subjects as Data Controllers: A
Fashion(able) Concept?’ (2019) <https://policyreview.info/articles/news/
data-subjects-data-controllers-fashionable-concept/1400> accessed 9
December 2019.
55 Google Spain (n 38) para 34; Wirtschaftsakademie (n 42) para 28; Jehovan
todistajat (n 46) para 66; Fashion ID (n 49) para 66.
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as they are the ones defining in technical terms how
smart home data are collected and for what potential
purposes. One might be tempted to argue that under
certain technical models where such developers do not
have access to the personal data, they may be considered
non-controllers. However, as highlighted above, the
Court has ruled in several cases that it is irrelevant
whether a concerned party has actual access or not to
the data when it comes to ascertaining its controller-
ship.56 This raises an array of questions regarding how
data subject rights could be exercised against such con-
trollers when many of those requests—such as access,
rectification, erasure—can be fulfilled only when the
controller has direct or indirect control over the per-
sonal data.
Equally profound are the implications for the users of
these technologies, who may find themselves in a di-
lemma where they make use of such systems in their
smart homes in the hope of enhancing privacy or cyber-
security for themselves, their family, their visitors or even
the entire infrastructural network, but end up being held
liable as a joint controller. From a technical point of
view, there is little substantial difference between operat-
ing a smart home device that enables data collection and
embedding a ‘Like’ button on a website that triggers data
transmission. Keeping smart homeowners in the expand-
ing circle of joint controllers may in individual cases offer
some extra protection to data subjects, but this may at
the same time create some widespread effects on the
adoption of these technologies.
While the WP and the Court seem to have taken into
consideration the fair assignment of responsibilities in
the case of joint controllership—as will be further dis-
cussed below—this would not be effective without fur-
ther guidance on who should be responsible for what
obligations in a given scenario. Before conducting a
more nuanced analysis of the allocation of responsibili-
ties, it is necessary to examine some general mechanisms
that may serve to push back the expanding boundaries
of joint controllership. In the next section, the house-
hold exemption will be discussed in detail.
Household exemption: what happens in
the house stays in the house?
Even if it is established that a person acts as a data con-
troller, solely or jointly, it does not always follow that
the full spectrum of data controller obligations will fall
on them. In fact, Article 2 of the GPDR carves out a list
of areas from its material scope, one being the house-
hold exemption, which could be potentially relevant to
the context of smart home security technologies. Article
2(2) GDPR provides that: ‘This Regulation does not ap-
ply to the processing of personal data: . . . (c) by a natu-
ral person in the course of a purely personal or
household activity’. Recital 18 further clarifies the
meaning of ‘a purely personal or household activity’
with the qualification of ‘with no connection to a pro-
fessional or commercial activity’. A number of examples
are also given in the same recital, which ‘could include
correspondence and the holding of addresses, or social
networking and online activity undertaken within the
context of such activities’. Compared with a similar re-
cital in the DPD, which gives examples ‘such as corre-
spondence and the holding of records of addresses’57,
the new GDPR recital may seem to have expanded the
scope by expressly including social networking and on-
line activities,58 it should be noted that the GDPR’s
‘could include’ wording may actually suggest a narrower
scope than that of the DPD’s ‘such as’.
The household exemption in a connected and
smart home
Before discussing the remit of ‘personal or household
activity’ in the light of these specific examples, and to
keep the discussion more focused on the challenging
issues, a more straightforward consideration should be
pointed out and excluded from our further discussion.
In the context of smart home IoT, it is unlikely that the
manufacturers of the devices or developers of the soft-
ware may benefit from this exemption. For one thing,
there is a clear professional or even commercial involve-
ment (regardless of their non-/for-profit status) that
would rule out the claim of purely personal activity. For
another thing, many of these manufacturers or develop-
ers are simply not natural persons, but rather organiza-
tions, which is also clearly excluded by the exemption.
It would be a different question whether they are (joint)
controllers, or what responsibilities they have in this
case. What is certain, however, is that they can hardly
avoid the application of the GDPR by invoking the
household exemption. A slightly more reasonable claim
may be made by individuals independently contributing
to the development of the technologies, but this would
56 Wirtschaftsakademie (n 42) para 38; Jehovan todistajat (n 46) para 69;
Fashion ID (n 49) para 82.
57 DPD, recital 12.
58 For the discussions of the applicability of the household exemption to so-
cial media users, see Napoleon Xanthoulis, Negotiating the EU Data
Protection Reform: Reflections on the Household Exemption (2013);
Rebecca Wong, ‘Social Networking: The Application of the Data
Protection Framework Revisited’ (2014) 2(2) Birkbeck Law Review 317.
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be also hard to justify because, apparently, the use of
such technologies concerns, if any, the household of the
user, not of the contributors.
For this reason, the discussion in this part will focus
mainly on whether the end users of S/PETs, namely the
homeowners, can be exempted from data controller
obligations. The CJEU decision on Rynes might be a
good starting point for this inquiry as it concerns the
use of CCTV—a home security device, albeit not a
smart one in this specific case.59 The Court was asked to
decide whether the operation of a CCTV installed on
one’s home but partly monitoring a public space falls
under the household exemption. In the judgment, it is
reasoned that:
[t]o the extent that video surveillance such as that at issue
in the main proceedings covers, even partially, a public
space and is accordingly directed outwards from the private
setting of the person processing the data in that manner, it
cannot be regarded as an activity which is a purely
“personal or household” activity . . ..60
Referring to Recital 18 DPD and by way of example, the
Court explains that such an activity may cover ‘corre-
spondence and the keeping of address books . . . even if
they incidentally concern or may concern the private
life of other persons’.61 Yet, the Court has not further
clarified whether it would make a difference if the
CCTV is directed entirely towards the inner space of a
family home.
However, it is evident that the CJEU has consistently
taken a remarkably strict approach to the scope of the
exemption. In fact, the Court has never ruled in favour
of a claim of the exemption in the limited number of
relevant cases it has decided on.62 In Jehovan todistajat,
for example, the Court has summarized the two consid-
erations established in previous cases that would pre-
clude the applicability of the household exemption: (a)
access by an unrestricted number of people; and (b) ex-
tension to a public space beyond the private setting of
the person.63
In this regard, the question central to the use of S/
PETs in a smart home setting would concern the extent
to which the use of data is confined to the private sphere
of the user and their family. Unlike the case of cameras,
however, there is no clear physical boundaries in an IoT
setting. While the purpose of the use of these technolo-
gies may well be solely for protecting the inner space of
home—informationally or physically—the adoption of
such measures may, depending on the exact technical
model, involve individuals outside the family, either in
physical proximity (eg neighbours, visitors) or in the
distance (eg other users connected to the same service).
More importantly, the domestic purpose or intention
alone does not form a sufficient basis for the household
exemption claim. In Rynes, even though the Court is
mindful that the use of CCTV may serve the purpose of
protecting one’s family, it nevertheless rejects the appli-
cability of the household exemption, and points to al-
ternative permissive mechanisms within the legal
framework, such as the ‘legitimate interests pursued by
the controller, such as the protection of the property,
health and life of his family and himself’.64
In this regard, it does not seem to matter whether a
smart homeowner deploys S/PET devices solely for do-
mestic purposes. The mere fact that such technologies
involve collection of personal data from outside the
family or dissemination of personal data to outside the
domestic sphere will sufficiently exclude the application
of the household exemption. The Court’s consistent re-
jection of the claims clearly shows the shrinking possi-
bility for users of these technologies to benefit from the
exemption.
Why exempt household activities in the first
place? A historical approach
The application of the household exemption means that
any data processing falling within the scope of ‘a purely
personal or household activity’ would not be subject to
any restrictions imposed by the GDPR. At first glance,
many might find this exclusion surprising or even un-
reasonable: One would expect a highest standard of data
protection at home as this amounts to a probably most
private and sensitive space. Yet, applying the exemption
does not mean that individuals are not protected when
it comes to household activities, as any access of data
from outside the household that intrude the private
sphere of the home would not be considered ‘personal’
and indeed would be subject to the GDPR. However,
this does raise the interesting question as to why such
an exemption was introduced in the first place.
The earliest equivalent to today’s definition of the
household exemption can be found in Sweden’s 1982
Amendment to the Data Act 1973, which provides that
the prior approval and reporting requirements for data
59 Case C-212/13 Rynes [2014] OJ C 46/6.
60 Ibid para 33.
61 Ibid para 32.
62 Case C-101/01 Lindqvist [2003] OJ C 7/3; Case C-73/07 Satakunnan
Markkinapo¨rssi and Satamedia [2008] OJ C 44/6; Rynes (n 59); Jehovan
todistajat (n 46).
63 Jehovan todistajat (n 46) para 42.
64 Rynes (n 59) para 34.
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registers do not apply to ‘personal data registers estab-
lished by an individual or exclusively for personal use’. 65
In the explanatory notes, this was justified on the ground
that ‘it is not possible to regulate all forms of use of per-
sonal data that normally occur in the daily interactions
between people, e.g. in private notes, address or phone
number lists, and letters etc’.66 as well as ‘registers relat-
ing to one’s own family finances’.67
On the international level, the updated version of
Convention 108 adopted in 2018 (‘Convention 108þ’)
includes a clear household exemption. In the new
Article 3(2), it is provided that ‘[t]his Convention shall
not apply to data processing carried out by an individ-
ual in the course of purely personal or household activi-
ties’. A rationale has been given in the Explanatory
Report:
This exclusion aims at avoiding the imposition of unrea-
sonable obligations on data processing carried out by indi-
viduals in their private sphere for activities relating to the
exercise of their private life. . . . The sharing of data within
the private sphere encompasses notably the sharing between
a family, a restricted circle of friends or a circle which is
limited in its size and based on a personal relationship or a
particular relation of trust.68
As regards the EU, the original Commission proposal of
the DPD offers a justification of excluding the applica-
tion to ‘files held by . . . an individual solely for private
and personal purposes’69: ‘[I]nvasions of privacy are un-
likely to occur . . . because the data are used for private
purposes only, as is the case with a personal electronic
diary’.70 Indeed, considering the potential risks in such
scenarios, it would be significantly disproportionate to
require individuals to comply with data protection law,
including allowing data subjects access to the data, just
because their personal details are mentioned in an e-
diary.
Even more interestingly, in the same proposal, an-
other account was provided in the draft Recital 9 (which
did not make its way to the Council’s Common
Position71): ‘[D]ata files falling exclusively within the
confines of the exercise of a natural person’s right to
privacy, such as personal address files, must be ex-
cluded’.72 While closely related to the point mentioned
in the previous paragraph, this explanation has taken a
somewhat different approach: Applying data protection
law to purely personal activities is not just unnecessary
for protecting the data subject, but also potentially in-
trusive for the individuals keeping such data,73 as it
would potentially force them to disclose highly sensitive
materials at the request of the data subject.
To sum up, from the limited number of official
documents providing an explanation to the introduc-
tion of a household exemption, three inseparable but
somewhat different theories can be identified: Data pro-
tection law should not apply to purely personal or
household activities because it would be (i) unfair, as it
would impose unreasonable obligations to the data con-
troller; (ii) unnecessary, as the privacy threats are mini-
mal in these cases; and (iii) invasive, as it would risk
forcing individuals to disclose confidential information.
When joint controllership and the
household exemption face a smart
home: do they still work?
Joint controllership and the household
exemption as mechanisms for allocating
responsibilities
In the two previous sections, it has been shown how the
scope of joint controllership has been widening whereas
the scope of the household exemption has been narrow-
ing as the two concepts have been interpreted by the
CJEU. Consequently, for owners of smart homes,
choosing to embrace a technology designed to improve
the security and privacy of their homes may mean a
high risk of being categorized a joint controller and
without the protection afforded by the household
exemption.
65 Lag (1982:446) om a¨ndring i datalagen (1973:289) [1982], § 2, para 3
(self-translation). Original text of a consolidated version can be found at
<https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/dokument-lagar/dokument/svensk-forfatt
ningssamling/datalag-1973289_sfs-1973-289> accessed 9 December
2019.
66 , ‘Regeringens proposition 1981/82:189 om a¨ndring i datalagen
(1973:289) m. m.’ (1982) 23 <https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/dokument-
lagar/dokument/proposition/om-andring-i-datalagen-1973289-mm_
G503189> accessed 15 April 2020 (self-translation).
67 Ibid 54 (self-translation).
68 Council of Europe, ‘Explanatory Report to the Protocol amending the
Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic
Processing of Personal Data’ (2018) 5.
69 Commission, ‘Proposal for a Council Directive concerning the protection
of individuals in relation to the processing of personal data’ (1990) 314
final—SYN 287.
70 Ibid.
71 Council, ‘Common Position (EC) No 1/95 adopted by the Council on 20
February 1995 with a view to adopting Directive 95/. . ./EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council of . . . on the protection of indi-
viduals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free
movement of such data’ (1995) 95/C 93/01.
72 Commission, ‘Proposal for a Council Directive concerning the protection
of individuals in relation to the processing of personal data’ (n 69).
73 See also Rebecca Wong and Joseph Savirimuthu, ‘All or Nothing: This Is
the Question? The Application of Article 3(2) Data Protection Directive
95/46/EC to the Internet’ (2008) XXV Journal of Computer &
Information Law 241.
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Joint controllership and the household exemption,
although as two separate legal issues, are closely linked
here since the former sets out the threshold whereby a
group of entities are made collectively responsible for
the data processing, whereas the latter functions in a
way that essentially exempts the individuals processing
personal data from controllership if the activities in
question are purely personal or domestic. The GDPR
further clarifies that the exemption applies only to natu-
ral persons but not to the entities providing means for
such activities.74 Accordingly, with regard to the proc-
essing involved in the sending of private messages on
social media, for example, the senders and receivers
may be exempted from the application of the GDPR,
but the social media service provider will not. In other
words, the household exemption is a controller-specific
exemption that seeks to relieve private individuals from
the compliance burdens.
For this reason, the notion of joint controllership
and the household exemption are in essence an all-or-
nothing mechanism by precluding the responsibilities
for some groups of data users, and thus imposing them
exclusively on some other groups.75 Working together,
these two concepts follow the logic that, if a person is a
data controller and unqualified for the household ex-
emption, then they will be charged with the full respon-
sibilities (or as a part of a full package of
responsibilities); otherwise, they will have no responsi-
bility at all. The responsibilities of each joint controller,
as explained below, may not be identical, but without
clear guidance, joint controllership may lead to a con-
siderable amount of burdens that are not proportionate
to the role of each controller. To the extent that joint
controllership and the household exemption determine
who should and who should not be held responsible for
data processing activities, they serve as a legal mecha-
nism to assign responsibilities.
This marks a fundamental difference underlying pri-
vacy and data protection law: while privacy law focuses
more on the secrecy of personal and private informa-
tion, data protection law mainly addresses the account-
ability of uses of personal data.76 As much as
confidentiality forms an important part of accountabil-
ity, the latter is achieved also through other mecha-
nisms, such as integrity, availability, transparency and
so on. One important aspect of a data protection regime
is thus to determine the extent to which the
responsibilities are distributed—or rather, centralized—
among various stakeholders. By setting out the house-
hold exemption, for instance, EU data protection law
has in effect removed the responsibilities from individu-
als when using personal data for purely personal activi-
ties. Indeed, individuals are expected to be subject to a
much lower level of accountability when they engage in
a conversation with family and friends, or handling per-
sonal details of family members within the household.
The way joint controllership and the household ex-
emption are laid down in the GDPR reflects a few
assumptions that might be valid for a traditional home
but probably not anymore for a smart home. First, it is
assumed that personal or domestic activities are mostly
confined within the physically discernible boundaries of
a private space. The keeping of an address book,77 for
example, usually operates solely within one’s home and
thus has little, if any, impact on the listed contacts.
Secondly, responsibilities can be clearly defined and
simply assigned or disassigned to a specified group of
persons. In the case of an address book, again, the
book-keepers would be the only parties responsible for
the use of the address book, which does not involve the
issues of shared responsibilities. Under these two condi-
tions, the two notions may work well in a straightfor-
ward manner: Within the house, no responsibility;
outside the house, full responsibility. However, as will
be shown in the rest of this section, these two assump-
tions do not work in an IoT context anymore.
In or out: disappearing boundaries of the
home
There should be little dispute that the examples pro-
vided by Recital 18 GDPR— ie ‘correspondence’, ‘hold-
ing of addresses’—can be reasonably exempted from the
application of data protection law since the imposition
of the obligations on individuals in these contexts
would be, as highlighted above, unfair, unnecessary and
invasive. Private messages mentioning a third-party in-
dividual solely for personal purpose, for instance,
should not result in the mentioned person given the
right to access the information. Again, this does not
mean that the information involved in such activities is
unprotected. Confidentiality of communications,
whether in postal or electronic forms, remains protected
by (e-)privacy law.
74 GDPR, Recital 18.
75 Brendan Van Alsenoy, ‘Regulating Data Protection: The Allocation of
Responsibility and Risk Among Actors Involved in Personal Data
Processing’ (KU Leuven 2016).
76 Orla Lynskey, ‘Deconstructing Data Protection: The “Added-value” of a
Right to Data Protection in the EU Legal Order’ (2014) 63 International
and Comparative Law Quarterly 569.
77 See GDPR, Recital 18.
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This is underpinned by the idea that certain spaces
can be clearly demarcated as private or personal, and
thus what happens within such spaces should be free
from interference. Interestingly, though, the two exam-
ples provided by Recital 18 in fact represent two quite
different types of private space, and not necessarily lim-
ited to the physical household. Koops distinguishes
‘home’ and ‘private communications’ as two different
types of ‘intimate zones’.78 Whereas ‘holding of
addresses’ can be considered within the ‘home’ space,
‘correspondence’ clearly falls within the ‘private com-
munications’ space. Yet, these two instances share the
similarly visible infrastructural boundaries that afford a
relatively high level of assurance that the information
contained within such boundaries—what happens in-
side the house, or what is written inside the envelope—
would not reach the outside world and would thus have
little external impact. Unless intentionally intruded or
disclosed, which clearly breaches the private space, the
expectation of what should stay private and thus subject
to a significantly lower level of accountability is rather
clear.
There is a rich body of literature discussing the im-
portance of boundary management under the heading
of ‘privacy’.79 Non-smart homes and non-electronic
communications in most cases have more manageable
boundaries as they are clearly defined and visible to all
parties. Setting aside the question whether privacy is a
helpful approach here,80 what should be less disput-
able is the challenge to boundary management posed
by the increasing prevalence of IoT technologies. The
boundaries of a smart home are remarkably more
fluid as smart devices may—and, sometimes indeed,
are designed to—transmit information about what is
happening inside the home to the remote cloud. Also,
the internal functioning of a smart home may be af-
fected by or even dependent on events taking place
outside the home. Even more fundamental, IoT tech-
nologies pose challenges to what is traditionally con-
sidered trusted as part of one’s home.81 Unlike a non-
smart home, the relational and informational bound-
aries have disentangled from the physical
boundaries.82
This is particularly the case in the scenarios central to
this article, ie S/PETs operating on an open-source,
data-intensive and dynamic basis, such as Databox or
DADA. Depending on the exact design of the system, a
smart home security solution may, for example, record
the presence of detected new devices, which could be
brought into or close to the house by visitors or neigh-
bours.83 Unlike using a physical domestic diary to keep
record of guests, such a system may store more details
of the device or reveal certain patterns. In most cases,
the communication and storage of information would
be secure, but it is certainly not as straightforward as a
paper diary book, and family members, visitors, neigh-
bours might have concerns over the safety of such infor-
mation. The functioning of devices may also be affected
by what is happening outside the home. The system
may decide, for instance, to disconnect a device from
the network after identifying suspicious pattern match-
ing a newly reported cyberattack.
In a hyper-connected setting like a smart home, it is
no longer clear whether the involved parties—the
homeowner, their family, their neighbours, their visi-
tors, other connected users, operators of the devices,
cloud providers—should be considered ‘inside’ or ‘out-
side’ the home. Or maybe more fundamentally, we
might need to reflect on the appropriateness of the met-
aphor of a traditional house—perhaps the external and
internal spheres are no longer separated by a thin wall,
but rather bridged by a spectrum of domains with dif-
ferent levels of proximity to the core of the home, and
thus carrying different expectations of accountability.84
78 Bert-Jaap Koops, ‘Privacy Spaces’ (2018) <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id¼3157169> accessed 9 December 2019.
79 For an overview, see Leysia Palen and Paul Dourish, ‘Unpacking
“Privacy” for a Networked World’ (SIGCHI Conference on Human
Factors in Computing Systems, Ft. Lauderdale, Florida, 5-10 April 2003);
Andy Crabtree, Peter Tolmie and Will Knight, ‘Repacking “Privacy” for a
Networked World’ (2017) 26(4–6) Computer Supported Cooperative
Work (CSCW) 453.
80 Crabtree, Tolmie and Knight (n 79).
81 Nicole Newmeyer, ‘The Impact of IoT Devices on Network Trust
Boundaries’ in Tyson T Brooks (ed), Cyber-Assurance for the Internet of
Things (IEEE Press, Piscataway 2017).
82 For example, smart home users have new ways to manage their relational
boundaries, including password sharing Crabtree, Tolmie and Knight (n
79) and other forms Alison Burrows, David Coyle and Rachael
Gooberman-Hill, ‘Privacy, Boundaries and Smart Homes for Health: An
Ethnographic Study’ (2018) 50 Health & Place 112.
83 This can be revealing in terms of surfacing domestic politics. See
Marshini Chetty and others, ‘Who’s Hogging the Bandwidth: The
Consequences of Revealing the Invisible in the Home’ (SIGCHI
Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems, Atlanta, Georgia,
10–15 April 2010).
84 Urquhart et al have explored a similar idea with reference to Brand’s
Shearing Layers in an Adaptive Architecture Lachlan Urquhart, Holger
Schna¨delbach and Nils Ja¨ger, ‘Adaptive Architecture: Regulating Human
Building Interaction’ (2019) 33 International Review of Law, Computers
& Technology 3. The idea of going beyond the private/public dichotomy
is also discussed in Lilian Edwards and Lachlan Urquhart, ‘Privacy in
Public Spaces: What Expectations of Privacy Do We Have in Social
Media Intelligence?’ (2016) 24 International Journal of Law and
Information Technology 279.
Jiahong Chen, Lilian Edwards, Lachlan Urquhart and Derek McAuley 11ARTICLE
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/idpl/advance-article/doi/10.1093/idpl/ipaa011/5900395 by The U
niversity of Edinburgh user on 16 Septem
ber 2020
To such an extent, a smart home may even be seen as a
digital ‘private-public place’.85
This points towards the need for further user-centric
research on user expectation and experiences in a smart
home equipped with S/PET systems, but from a legal
point of view, the assumption that a relatively clear line
can be drawn between the domestic and public spaces
will only become increasingly unrealistic.86
All or nothing: centralized data controllership
in a decentralized technological reality
In a simple, one-to-one legal relationship, the GDPR’s
centralized model mirrored in joint controllership and
the household exemption87 have the benefit of allowing
for a clear focal point of obligations largely reflecting
the expected roles of the parties involved. When it
comes to a highly complex technological setting, how-
ever, it does not seem fair anymore to distribute the
duties of care in an all-or-nothing manner. The example
of S/PETs discussed in this article serves as a good case
in point: Such technologies rely on the collaborative in-
volvement of a range of actors who have different roles
to play, and thus have different level of control over the
functioning of the system.
We propose to use functional terms to capture the
nature of control exercised by a variety of actors. The
developers of the system, for example, have schematic
control as they determine the structure of data and pro-
tocols mandating the communications between compo-
nents across the system, but they have no access to the
actual data; the device manufacturers have input control
as they determine what data are collected and transmit-
ted through the network; the developers of drivers or
apps have interpretative control as they determine how
data or data pattern can be translated into actionable
decisions; the users (homeowners) have operational con-
trol as they determine what components or functionali-
ties are enabled. As a preliminary example, however,
this taxonomic approach will certainly require further
theoretical and practical elaboration.
The level of integration and inter-dependency be-
tween various types of actors means that accountability
is shared, not just in proportional/quantitative terms
but also in a functional/qualitative manner. The opera-
tional control by the users naturally requires them not
to abuse the system by, say, monitoring the digital
activities of their neighbours; the input control by the
manufacturers requires them not to over-collect data;
the schematic control by the developers requires them
not to make unauthorized data sharing possible between
different components. Sitting in different functional
divisions of the system, they are in position for different
forms of accountability. Particularly important are the
asymmetries in resources and power reflected in differ-
ent forms of control and the implications for regulation.
The simple answer offered by joint controllership and
the household exemption, however, seems to have failed
to reflect such a complex landscape. The idea of differ-
entiated responsibilities as envisaged by the WP and the
CJEU—which will be discussed in the next section—
may mitigate this issue to some extent, but certain chal-
lenges remain.
In this regard, the GDPR contains a provision that is
highly relevant but remarkably under-discussed: Recital
78 provides that ‘producers of the products, services
and applications should be encouraged to take into ac-
count the right to data protection . . . with due regard to
the state of the art, to make sure that controllers and
processors are able to fulfil their data protection obliga-
tions’. It sheds some light on the roles that the involved
parties are expected to assume in the collaborative pro-
cess of improving security/privacy for smart homes.
Interestingly though, it seems these producers are not
categorized as data controllers (or at least implying that
they can be treated as non-controllers in some contexts)
as they are simply ‘encouraged’ but not ‘obliged’ (as the
case would be for a controller) to take into account the
rights of the data subjects. In the case of S/PETs for
smart homes, the contributors to some components are
technically not data controllers indeed—due to the fact
that, say, they do not actually determine the overall pur-
pose of the system but simply offer a partial technical
solution to the community. Yet, it does not follow that
they do not have any control over how data are eventu-
ally processed. It equally does not follow that it would
be fair to impose the full range of data controller obliga-
tions on them. In determining to what degree and in
what form they should act responsibly and how such re-
sponsibilities should be translated into legal obligations,
maybe it would take more than an answer of yes or no.
The same goes for the owner of a smart home
equipped with such technologies—they have a certain
level of control over the use of data for purposes that
85 Lilian Edwards, ‘Privacy, Security and Data Protection in Smart Cities: A
Critical EU Law Perspective’ (2016) 2(1) European Data Protection Law
Review 28.
86 See also Zuzanna Warso, ‘There’s More to It Than Data Protection -
Fundamental Rights, Privacy and the Personal/Household Exemption in
the Digital Age’ (2013) 29 Computer Law & Security Review 491.
87 Rene´ Mahieu, Joris Van Hoboken and Hadi Asghari, ‘Responsibility for
Data Protection in a Networked World: On the Question of the
Controller, “Effective and Complete Protection” and its Application to
Data Access Rights in Europe’ (2019) 10 JIPITEC 85.
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might be largely but not necessarily entirely ‘personal or
household’. In order to decide the extent to which the
exemption should apply to them, one would need to go
back to the three questions that the early legislator
adopting the household exemption might have asked
themselves: Is it fair to impose the data controller obli-
gations on them? Is it necessary to do so taking into ac-
count the potential risks? Is it invasive to do so
considering the implications for the homeowner and
their family? The three answers may not be fully consis-
tent anymore. Perhaps more importantly, in a world of
decentralized control over data processing, and possibly
diffused responsibilities among entities,88 these ques-
tions might well be a matter of balance rather than one
of choice.
Differentiated responsibilities among
joint controllers: promises and
limitations
One might argue that the expanding scope of joint con-
trollership and the shrinking scope of the household ex-
emption do not necessarily mean disproportionate
obligations imposed on certain groups of actors.
Indeed, Article 26(1) of the GDPR requires that joint
controllers should ‘in a transparent manner determine
their respective responsibilities for compliance with the
obligations under this Regulation . . . by means of an ar-
rangement between them’.89 Also, while this require-
ment is newly introduced by the GDPR, during the time
of the DPD, the WP as well as the CJEU have already
expressed some support to such a possibility.
The A29 WP has indeed anticipated the need to as-
certain ‘which controller is competent – and liable – for
which data subjects’ rights and obligations . . . where the
various joint controllers share purposes and means of
processing in an asymmetrical way’.90 While the WP has
not ruled out the possibility of joint and several
liability—ie each and all joint controllers fully liable for
any breach arising from the data processing—it has
pointed out that in most cases ‘the various controllers
maybe be responsible – and thus liable – for the
processing of personal data at different stages and to dif-
ferent degrees’.91
This interpretation has later been confirmed by the
Court in Wirtschaftsakademie, which states that ‘the ex-
istence of joint responsibility does not necessarily imply
equal responsibility of the various operators involved in
the processing of personal data’ and that ‘those opera-
tors may be involved at different stages of that process-
ing of personal data and to different degrees, so that the
level of responsibility of each of them must be assessed
with regard to all the relevant circumstances of the par-
ticular case’.92 This approach is subsequently reaffirmed
by the Court in both Jehovan todistajat93 and Fashion
ID.94
As explained above, it is indeed reasonable and nec-
essary to differentiate the obligations of different con-
trollers taking into account their respective roles in the
whole process of determining the purposes and means
of data processing. However, the approach proposed by
the WP, later confirmed by the Court and then adopted
by the GDPR is subject to a number of challenges.
Firstly, the current mechanism is largely based on the
assumption that joint controllers have or can come to
agree on how the responsibilities should be distributed
among themselves. In fact, as mentioned above, data
controllers are required to do so under the GDPR ‘by
means of an arrangement between them’.95 Yet, our
analysis in the section on joint controllership above has
shown that the establishment of controllership does not
require a legal arrangement between the concerned par-
ties, and can simply result from technical or organiza-
tional configurations. Even if it is argued that such an
arrangement can and should be concluded, in the con-
text of open-source development, this would be highly
difficult.96
Secondly, both the WP and the Court have consid-
ered the possibility of joint controllers as a result of data
processing ‘at different stages’ or ‘to different degrees’,
and thus the ‘level of responsibility’ should be differen-
tiated. This solution essentially views the distribution of
data protection responsibilities as a matter of degree in
temporal or proportional terms, which would make
sense in allocating ex post responsibilities—ie liabilities.
Van Alsenoy, for example, analyses the liabilities of data
88 See Christopher Millard and others, ‘At This Rate, Everyone Will Be a
[Joint] Controller of Personal Data!’ (2019) 9(4) International Data
Privacy Law 217.
89 GDPR, art 26(1).
90 Art 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 1/2010 on the concepts
of “controller” and “processor”’ (n 20).
91 Ibid.
92 Wirtschaftsakademie (n 42) para 43.
93 Jehovan todistajat (n 46) para 66.
94 Fashion ID (n 49) para 70.
95 GDPR, art 26(1).
96 Mahieu, Van Hoboken and Asghari (n 87).
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controllers and data processors from a tort law perspec-
tive.97 The joint and several liability approach, for ex-
ample, can be supported by Recital 14698 and justified
with the ‘common fault’ theory,99 although the GDPR
exempts controllers who can prove ‘not in any way re-
sponsible’.100 However, unlike tort law, data protection
law concerns not only ex post liabilities, but also ex ante
duties, including the mandatory conditions for lawful
processing of personal data and other safeguards
throughout the personal data lifecycle. The way liabili-
ties are distributed among responsible parties, often
ascertained in monetary form and as a matter of degree,
would not be suitable for allocating ex ante duties. As
highlighted in the previous section, different forms of
control (eg schematic, input, interpretative, operational,
etc) would put joint controllers in different positions to
adopt different measures, which is a matter not the
same as ‘different stages’ or ‘different degrees’. In any
case, the default approach of joint and several liability is
certainly unhelpful in assigning data protection respon-
sibilities fairly.
Thirdly, it remains unclear how to reconcile what
seems to be a conflict101 between the requirement to de-
termine the responsibilities among joint controllers102
and the proviso that data subject rights can be exercised
against any of the joint controller.103 One potential so-
lution rests in Article 26(2), which requires the arrange-
ment between joint controllers to ‘duly reflect the
respective roles and relationships of the joint controllers
vis-a`-vis the data subjects’.104 This can be interpreted as
allowing joint controllers to appoint one of them to be
responsible for certain types of data subject rights, as
long as this mirrors its role and relationship with the
data subject; otherwise, the data subject would not be
bound by such a designation and may decide to exercise
their rights against any of the controllers.105
In practice, some of these challenges may be slightly
mitigated by restricting the ways data subject rights may
be exercised against some of the joint controllers.
Article 23 of the GDPR allows Member State laws to set
out such restrictions on a number of bases, including
safeguarding ‘the protection of the data subject or the
rights and freedoms of others’.106 The security and pri-
vacy interest of the homeowners, for instance, may be
recognized by national laws against the rights of the
data subjects. Making these rules, however, would re-
quire a strong justification based on fair allocation of re-
sponsibilities, and may risk creating further
fragmentation among Member States.
The lack of legal certainty on these matters may sig-
nificantly impede the development and adoption of
smart home technologies that would enhance privacy
and security for IoT users. Fair allocation of data pro-
tection responsibilities would entail going beyond the
current approaches of joint controllership and the
household exemption, and instead, investigating what
role each of the participating parties is playing, and ac-
cordingly, what appropriate duties they should be
expected to assume.107 Much work is needed to map
out different categories of actors in the domestic IoT
ecosystem in order to ascertain their best position in the
data protection regime. Since it is now part of the
EDPB’s plan to review the WP’s Opinion on controller
and processor,108 the need to carry out further research,
both theoretically and empirically, will become even
more pressing.
Conclusion
Before the advent of smart home IoT technologies,
ascertaining how data protection law should regulate
users in a domestic setting was once straightforward;
the burdens of domestic data controllers were alleviated
by relieving them of the data protection responsibilities.
This is not the case anymore. The use of cases discussed
throughout this article have shown how domestic IoT
has challenged some of the underlying assumptions of
data protection law, and has created legal uncertainties
as to who should assume the primary responsibility
among a group of stakeholders connected to the smart
home edge computing architectures, as well as how ac-
countability can be achieved in a coordinated and
shared manner between them.
97 Brendan Van Alsenoy, ‘Liability under EU Data Protection Law: From
Directive 95/46 to the General Data Protection Regulation’ (2016) 7
JIPITEC 271.
98 Valentina Colcelli, ‘Joint Controller Agreement under GDPR’ (2019) 3
EU and Comparative Law Issues and Challenges Series 1030.
99 Van Alsenoy, ‘Liability under EU Data Protection Law’ (n 97).
100 GDPR, art 82(3).
101 See Fashion ID (n 49) Opinion of AG Bobek, para 80.
102 GDPR, art 26(1).
103 Ibid art 26(3).
104 Ibid art 26(2).
105 See art 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 1/2010 on the con-
cepts of “controller” and “processor”’ (n 20) 24.
106 GDPR, art 23(1)(i). For a discussion on how this can be applied to a con-
text of freedom of expression, see David Erdos, ‘Beyond “Having a
Domestic”? Regulatory Interpretation of European Data Protection Law
and Individual Publication’ (2017) 33 Computer Law & Security Review
275.
107 For a discussion of allocating data protection responsibilities with a num-
ber of use cases, see Van Alsenoy, ‘Regulating Data Protection’ (n 75).
108 European Data Protection Board, ‘EDPB Work Program 2019/2020’
(2019) <https://edpb.europa.eu/sites/edpb/files/files/file1/edpb-2019-02-
12plen-2.1edpb_work_program_en.pdf> accessed 9 December 2019.
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This raises the fundamental issue of how data protec-
tion law should regulate smart homes. The expanding
scope of joint controllership and the shrinking scope of
the household exemption, as discussed above, are
intended to ensure a high degree of accountability, and
to ensure data subjects always have someone to answer
for their requests. Important as this consideration is, the
current interpretative approach may end up unfairly
burdening certain stakeholders in smart homes and
thus disincentivise uptake of edge computing solutions
such as Databox and DADA. Paradoxically this may
then result in a lower degree of privacy, as well as secu-
rity, for smart home inhabitants.
We argue that this issue goes beyond mere black let-
ter law interpretation of the GDPR. Further research is
needed to conceptualize the control of various natures
exercised by different stakeholders in smart IoT systems.
Normatively, an analytical framework should be
developed to situate stakeholders according to the influ-
ence they have in ensuring collective accountability with
others. Empirically, further evidence is required for a
better understanding of the power dynamics among
stakeholders with asymmetric resources and various
control, as well as public perceptions of what amounts
to fair reassignment of responsibility and accountability
in a domestic IoT context. All these considerations, if
properly explored and translated across disciplines—
computer science, law, human-computer interaction,
and ethnomethodology109—will inform both the design
of future IoT systems or S/PETs and the creation of the
wider regulatory environment to support those
developments.
doi:10.1093/idpl/ipaa011
109 For the latest research in this field, see Murray Goulden, ‘“Delete the
Family”: Platform Families and the Colonisation of the Smart Home’
(2019) Information, Communication & Society 1.
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